Treaty V Executive Agreement

41 i. around 1336 („[I]n the President will probably find it more difficult, on the whole, to withdraw unilaterally from a congress-executive agreement than from an Article II treaty.“). Some scientists doubt the claim that presidents can more easily withdraw from treaties than from agreements between Congress and the executive. As Koremenos and Galbraith point out, many agreements in the UN Treaty Collection have withdrawal provisions that would allow a president to legally leave an agreement, regardless of the form in which it was concluded. See Barbara Koremenos, The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design 124 (2016) (70% of agreements have opt-out provisions based on a random sample of contracts in the UN Treaty Collection); Galbraith, note 26 above, to 1720 (arguing that the withdrawal provisions give successors to the current president a simple way to legally withdraw from a contract). For doctrinal challenges to the allegation that contracts can be withdrawn more easily, see Bradley, see note 36 above. This focus on selection models is a very indirect approach to identifying differences in policy instruments, based on a series of strong assumptions, such as a correct model specification and a causal link between the identified designs and the hypothesized patterns. Without these assumptions, the observed actions can result from a multitude of different motivations, so it is impossible to deduce which instrument is the most reliable. For example, Martin`s finding that high GDP is correlated with the use of contracts does not necessarily mean that the treaty is being used because the partner country has a high GDP.

As noted below, the treaty is Common Note 59 for agreements between the United States and Western European countries. Footnote 60 On average, these countries tend to have a high GDP per capita, but they also share a number of other characteristics that could explain the results, such as a common history of Roman law and respect for legal status. Moreover, Martin`s findings that „quality“ agreements increase the likelihood of contract use do not only correspond to signal theory, but also to the hypothesis proposed by Bradley and Morrison that „large“ agreements give selective Senate attention. . . .