Are Executive Agreements Unconstitutional
Zschernig had been asleep for some time and, although it was recently examined by the Court of Justice, it remains the only holding company in which the Court has used dormant foreign policy power to make state law too low. In the 1990s, there was a renewed academic interest in Zschernig, when some state and local governments have sought ways to express their displeasure with foreign governments` human rights policy or to restrict trade with adverse countries.507 In 1999, the court repealed The Massachusetts Burmese Sanctions Act on the basis of legal pre-kaufs rights and refused to refer to the alternative holding of the court. Appeal 508 In 2003, the court found that the California Victim Insurance Relief Act had been anticipated as an interference with the foreign policy of the Confederacy, which is reflected in the executive agreements, and although the court discussed Zschernig at length, it did not see the need to resolve issues related to its scope.509 In the United States , executive agreements are concluded exclusively by the President of the United States. They are one of three mechanisms through which the United States makes binding international commitments. Some authors view executive agreements as treaties of international law because they bind both the United States and another sovereign state. However, under U.S. constitutional law, executive agreements are not considered treaties within the meaning of the contractual clause of the U.S. Constitution, which requires the Council and the approval of two-thirds of the Senate to be considered a treaty. 496 In Field v. Clark, 453 statutes that give the president the power to enter into trade agreements have been upheld against the objection that an unconstitutional delegation of „legislative and contractual powers“ has been confirmed.
The Court faced the first objection with a comprehensive review of similar legislation since the inauguration of the government, in accordance with the Constitution. The second objection he raised is correct: „What has been said also applies to the objection that the third part of the act confers contractual power on the President. The Court considers that the third part of the act of October 1, 1890 is not subject to the objection it confers on the President legislative and contractual power. 454 Although two judges disagreed, the issue was never revived. In B. Altman – Co. v. United States,455, an accompanying question was asked twenty years later. Whether it was an act of Congress, the federal district courts of the appelal court for cases where „the validity or construction of a contract . . . .
It was called into question,“ a case in which it was a trade agreement under the Customs Act of 1897. The Court replied: „It may be true that this trade agreement, concluded under the authority of Customs Act 1897, No. 3, was not a treaty that had the dignity of a treaty that must be ratified by the United States Senate, but it was an international pact negotiated between the representatives of two sovereign nations and concluded on behalf of the States Parties. , and looked at the important trade relations between the two countries and was proclaimed by the President. While it is not technically a treaty that requires ratification, nevertheless, it was a pact approved by the United States Congress, negotiated and proclaimed under the authority of its president. We believe that such a pact is a contract under the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, and where its construction is directly involved, as is the case here, there is a right of direct appeal verification to that court. 456 Dictum in Garamendi recognizes some of the issues that may be raised about Zschernig.